Ordinary macroscopic material objects A and B coincide at a time if at that time they share the very same spatial regions and are made of the same underlying matter. Many philosophers hold that some easily possible or even actual material objects that coincide at a time are non-identical, e.g., a statue and the hunk of clay that it's materially coincident with. Following Kit Fine (2003), I'll call those philosophers pluralists. Other philosophers, monists, think that there are no pairs of distinct coincident ordinary material objects.
7.
It's not the case that at T Y is [aesthetically] valuable.
8.
Due to their form, if (6) and (7) are true, then X ≠ Y.
9. X and Y are coincident at T.
10.
Thus, at T X ≠ Y but X and Y are coincident.
Just because X has monetary value and Y doesn't have aesthetic value doesn't mean that X isn't Y.
For the most part, Fine supposes that the monist will reply to the new Leibniz's Law arguments by trying to argue that they have a false third premise-i.e., the new arguments will fail due to a failure of transparency, just as in (6)- (10) . Here I think the monist may have a plausible response, one that dodges Fine's arguments. Although the monist will sometimes react as Fine describes, more often than not, as I will show in the following sections, she will find reason to doubt instances of the second premise, (2).
Comparing Arguments
1 Throughout the essay I use 'hunk of clay' in order to emphasize the singular reference of 'the clay'. The monist thinks that the hunk of clay is identical to Rover; she does not think that the clay-the bits of clay-are somehow identical to Rover. So plural uses of 'the clay' are irrelevant. 2 For simplicity I sometimes refer to sentences, as opposed to their contexts, as transparent or opaque.
Analogously, the monist should, at least for most contexts (more on this qualification later) reject (12), 'It's not the case that the hunk of clay is valuable/Romanesque/admired'. That is, the monist just doesn't see anything semantically untoward in asserting that this very special hunk of clay is quite valuable, Romanesque, beautiful, admirable, well-made, purchased from Beardsley, and insured for £10,000. Obviously, most hunks of clay are worthless, not admired, not Romanesque, and certainly not insured for £10,000; but we're considering a very special hunk of clay. It is somewhat disrespectful and definitely misleading to call it 'a hunk of clay', as that phrase very strongly suggests that it is a mere hunk of clay-one that isn't a statue or anything else of significance. But it's a hunk of clay all the same. Before the sculptor begins she has a mere hunk of clay. Basilica was a chair; all of these are or were material objects. In these cases we want to protest, "It's not just a building! It's not just a statue! It wasn't just a chair! It's not just a material object!", and the monist agrees wholeheartedly but sees no conflict. A £20 bill is a piece of paper, and of course on most occasions you can't buy much by handing someone a piece of paper-but for very special pieces of paper you can. I quite literally spend pieces of paper all the time-but of course they have to be quite special pieces of paper. My wife is a material object-but of course not just any old material object! It seems to me the most natural monist position involves the rejection of (12) in the pluralist's argument.
There is of course oddity in saying that a hunk of clay is insured for £10,000, or that one can spend a piece of paper, or that I'm married to a material object, or that people travel thousands of miles to see a chair. But conversational oddity is hardly a good reason for attributing falsehood, at least in this area of metaphysics. Carl the cowboy did a historic exposé of Nixon and Ralph the reporter holds the state record for bronco busting; and these truths exist even if the expression of either of them would be odd to anyone but Carl and his wife.
I'm not saying that monism is true! As I said earlier, I'm inclined to side with Fine on the truth of pluralism. What I am saying is that rejecting (12) will assume in this essay that he wanted to close off monism altogether (as his article certainly seemed intended).
Perhaps as a defence of (12) and (17) and is Romanesque; the piece of fabric [that "composes" a dress] is worth a fortune; I spent that piece of paper [currency] on a Caesar salad at the restaurant' does so with considerable strain and perhaps not even "meaningfully" (2003, 207) . 5 However, I don't see any strain on meaningfulness any different from the strain of 'Carl the cowboy did a historical exposé of Nixon, and Ralph the reporter holds the state record for bronco-busting' (or the other odd sentences mentioned in the second paragraph of this section). Everyone who takes these metaphysical issues seriously ends up saying something odd. For instance, the pluralist says that the statue is 14 kg, the hunk of clay is 14kg, but when you put them both on an accurate scale at the same time, the scale will read just 14kg. Similar difficulties arise with many other sentences, e.g., 'Tom knocked two objects off the table, the statue and the hunk'. The pluralist has stories to tell here, to show that the sentences are true albeit 4 In correspondence Fine suggested this move, but did not say whether he endorsed it. Some philosophers of language obsessed with substitutivity issues (such as myself in my 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002 ) might want to engage in semantic gymnastics in order to guarantee the truth of virtually anything conversationally appropriate, but I think this is primarily due not to insight but to the obsession just mentioned combined with an allergy to error theories. Joseph Moore (1999 and , Graeme Forbes (1997 ), and Stefano Predelli (2004 each take seriously the claim that 'Kent can't fly' is often true. But I think that the reporter/cowboy examples, as well as others, make the point I've tried to make with 'Superman' and 'Kent'. 5 Actually, he suggests that the clay isn't Romanesque, where 'the clay' indicates something like stuff, and not necessarily (I don't know) a single material object. He doesn't use 'piece of clay'. I don't know if he would also say that the piece of clay (materially coincident with a statue) can't be meaningfully said to be Romanesque.
conversationally odd. But this just shows that the presence of linguistic strain in the monist's defence is not that much of a weakness: everybody has that problem. And hair-splitting ('Your linguistic strains are much worse than mine') is not going to carry much weight.
However, the monist probably should not deny the truth of every use of (12). For on some occasions uses of (12) will be true-just as some uses of (17) will be true. But we have to be careful here. One might initially think that if Lois Lane says, 'Kent is a lousy date; Superman's a great date', then her remark is true-and that would make the conjunction of (16) and (17) 
Sculptor Al
Matters are more complicated with an intriguing story Fine uses to mount further arguments against the monist, a story that he judges to supply the most damaging criticisms of the monistic reaction to the new Leibniz's Law arguments for pluralism. I will use 'the piece of alloy' to emphasize the uniqueness of the referent of 'the alloy'.
One of Fine's primary arguments for pluralism based on the Al story has the following basic structure, ignoring the details:
21.
The piece of alloy is well made.
22.
The piece of alloy is not badly made.
23.
The statue is badly made. The monist has insuperable troubles accounting for the truth of (21)-(24).
26.
So, monism is false.
Right away there is an apparent problem: why would the monist agree that (21)- (23) are true in Fine's story about Al? According to the monist, the piece of alloy just is the statue, so how on earth could it be badly made and not badly made, as Fine sets it up? How can the monist even understand Fine's thought experiment given that it includes the stipulations 'The piece of alloy is not badly made' and 'The statue is badly made'? Doesn't it simply follow from these stipulations that the statue isn't the piece of alloy? It looks as though Fine has smuggled pluralism into the thought experiment as an assumption. What a lousy argument! As we'll see below, this point is relevant to assessing the pluralist's argument based on the Al story. However, it is a mistake to think the pluralist has simply assumed pluralism at the outset. If I understand Fine correctly, the pluralist's assumption is that there is some natural reading of (21)- (24) 6 Fine uses this thought experiment, along with slight variations of it, to mount many pluralist arguments. I certainly don't have the space to consider all his arguments; his long and complicated article is overflowing with them. Instead, I investigate what I suspect and hope to be the main ones. 7 For ease of reading, I've substituted a character named 'Fred' for Kit Fine himself.
under which they're all true-a reading the monist must admit exists. Then the monist must attempt to find a way to account for the truth of (21)- (24)-an account that is consistent with monism. The pluralist thinks this can't be done plausibly. There might be other interpretations of (21)- (24) under which some of them are false, or obviously question-begging against the monist, but the pluralist isn't (she claims) interested in those readings. All she needs to mount a decent argument against monism is one convenient reading under which they're true; then she can challenge the monist to account for that reading. So: is there a reading that makes (21)- (24) true but not obviously question begging?
Let's focus on (21)- (23) (21) and (23) might, given the right contextual factors, semantically express the proposition P 1 better expressed by 'The piece of alloy is well made overall or on balance when judged by materials standards; the statue is badly made overall or on balance when judged by artistic standards'. Under this reading (21)- (23) are true, just as the pluralist says. But of course this doesn't suggest that statue isn't the piece of alloy, as there is no reason at all to accept (25) for this context.
I'm not saying that P 1 ever is the semantic value of the conjunction of (21) and (23), for any context of use, although that's a reasonable idea. I'm saying this: if P 1 is the semantic value of the conjunction, then although it's true, this, all by itself, offers no support for pluralism.
Perhaps the conjunction of (21) and (23) sometimes semantically expresses proposition P 2 :
the piece of alloy is well made overall, when we tally absolutely all standards; the statue is badly made overall, when we tally absolutely all standards. But then the monist will of course take P 2 to fail to be true! In fact, depending on the context of use in which the conjunction of (21) and (23) expresses P 2 , it might be unclear which of (21) and (23), if either, is true. The statue-alloy is well made in one respect and badly made in another; how are we supposed to do the sum? But in any case, the monist will plausibly hold that the conjunction isn't true (it will either be truth-valueless or false).
So P 2 won't help the pluralist's cause.
The conjunction of (21) and (23) (25) will be implausible. This case isn't interestingly different from the scenario in which the conjunction expresses P 1 . So P 3 won't help either.
The conjunction might semantically express proposition P 4 : the piece of alloy is well made in at least one materials respect; the statue is badly made in at least one artistic respect. True, but consistent with monism as (25) is once again left implausible. Similarly, if it expresses the claim P 5 that the piece of alloy is well made in at least some respect, while the statue is badly made in at least one respect, the conjunction is true; but none of this helps the pluralist.
27.
The piece of alloy is highly valuable.
28.
The statue is virtually without value.
29.
Commenting on Al's entry (which used 'piece of alloy'), Fred's remark 'Al referred to an item virtually without value' is most naturally understood as false.
30.
The monist has insuperable troubles accounting for the truth of (27)-(29).
31.
Al is making a list of his works that are "highly valuable" (as it's written at the top of his list). He writes 'The piece of alloy'. He's right: the alloy is valuable in that it is made of extremely expensive materials. So (27) when I accepted (28), I set aside the first kind of value and focussed on another kind; if I hadn't, then I wouldn't have accepted (28). Hence, given an interpretation akin to that which generated P 1 ('The piece of alloy is well made overall or on balance when judged by materials standards; the statue is badly made overall or on balance when judged by artistic standards'), for instance, (27)-(29) can be 8 As Fine remarked in correspondence. 9 Here I skip the irrelevant analogue to (22).
true, but then (30) is baseless. In fact, the only contexts I know of that plausibly make each of (27)-(29) true seem to demand a false reading for (30) (since we haven't been given any reason to think that the truths expressed by (27)-(29), in this context, suggest the falsehood of monism). And when I focus on an interpretation akin to that which generated P 2 ('The piece of alloy is well made overall, when we tally absolutely all standards; the statue is badly made overall, when we tally absolutely all standards), then the conjunction of (27) and (28) has the truth condition had by 'The piece of alloy is highly valuable, when we tally absolutely all kinds of value; the statue is virtually without value, when we tally absolutely all kinds of value'. But then the monist will of course take the conjunction to fail to be true. As before, I'm not making any claim about the truth condition of the naked conjunction of (27) and (28); instead, I'm saying that I can't find a context of use in which (27)- (30) all express truths.
Or consider the argument that results when we use terms such as 'Romanesque' or 'insured for just £100'.
32.
The piece of alloy is insured for just £100.
33.
The statue fails to be insured for just £100 (it's insured for £10,000).
34.
Commenting on Al's entry (which used 'piece of alloy'), Fred's remark 'Al referred to an item that fails to be insured for just £100' is most naturally understood as false.
35.
The monist has insuperable troubles accounting for the truth of (32)-(34).
36.
Al is making a list of his works that are insured for just £100. He writes 'the piece of alloy'. It seems to me that the monist is well within her rights to insist that (32) is just plain false-even though it can pragmatically convey a truth. There are two insurance policies for the one item, one policy that pays up if the item is damaged according to standards having to do with being a statue and the other policy paying up when the materials are seriously damaged. The statue-alloy is insured, in total, for £10,100; so (32) is false.
Now perhaps there is a reading of (32)- (34) that makes all of them come out true. For instance, the conjunction of (32) and (33) might have the truth condition had by a sentence such as 'The piece of alloy is insured for just £100 when it comes to materials; the statue fails to be insured for just £100 when it comes to statue standards'. That sounds pretty awkward to my ears, but perhaps the conjunction of (32) and (33) could semantically express that truth condition, or a similar truth condition, in the right context. But there are two problems: first, under such a reading (35) is without any motivation; and second, the natural monist move, with regard to 'is insured for just £100' (or 'is Romanesque') is the one Fine didn't seem to consider: (32) is false. So it is difficult to see how this new Leibniz's Law argument is supposed to be convincing.
